Abu Kamal, Syria Raid by US SpecOps

In case you haven't heard about the strike in Syria...

Credit: Wikipedia

Any thoughts?

My thinking goes like this: Israeli-Syrian negotiations are actually going somewhere (for once) and we should work with the two parties to get a satisfactory deal, however, this was a necessary raid.
(a) It is still likely Syria will make a deal.
(b) As Obama has pointed out, crossing borders for high value targets is most definitely a smart thing to do.
(c) It sends a signal to regional countries, not the least of which is Iran, that we aren't f*cking around, to put it simply.

On Force and Diplomacy

You make one fatal assumption, however. You believe that the North Koreans would believe that we would actually attack them. There's no way we would, right now. Maybe 10 years ago they would have believed us capable, when we weren't involved in Iraq and Afghanistan, but there's no way now.

I am not against diplomacy backed up by force (you do need carrots to go along with those sticks, though). The worry by you conservatives would be, of course, you have to be willing to actually use that force when push comes to shove. I might have said some contradictory things before, but I do believe that force is sometimes necessary. You just have to know when to limit it. I believe that the invasion of Grenada, the invasion of Panama, the first Gulf War, and Clinton's Operation Desert Fox were all necessary and carried out well. We did not occupy for five years and we only took down the government when we knew what we were getting into - we knew our limits.

I hate to sound like that liberal that always goes back to blaming Bush, but: Bush did not know his limits. He unnecessarily invaded Iraq, which took away press, money, supplies, troops, and most importantly public attention away from Afghanistan. Maybe we could have launched airstrikes in Iraq. Maybe that would have been acceptable; however, overthrowing the Hussein regime took it to far. And Bush, Cheney, Rumsfeld and Co. didn't even do it well! The occupation of Iraq was a failure.

Anyway, I'm getting a little side tracked. My point is this: negotiations carried out with the threat of force are always great, as long as you know your limits.

So: how about in 10 years, when we're out of Iraq and Afghanistan (I can't wait), we settle down and talk to those Russians. Tell them, hey, you invade Germany from your newly established bases in conquered Poland - we'll kick your ass.

Deal Would Have the US Out of Iraq by 2012 - A Good Plan

NYT: Draft Accord With Iraq Sets Goal of 2011 Pullout

Note
I cannot fully write about this yet because of the fact that the agreement has not been released, and I don’t know if the full treaty will every fully be released. However: details will continue to come in, and as they do, I will write new articles.

A good plan
United States and Iraqi negotiators have been haggling over a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) for several months now. Up until now, the international military presence in Iraq has been legitimized by United Nations Security Council Resolutions. This new agreement will last three years and its main points are this:

1. U.S. troops must move outside of cities by June 30, 2009
2. Withdrawal of all U.S. combat forces by the end of December 31, 2011
3. No immunity for private contractors
4. Some immunity for American soldiers (immunity if on base or on duty)
5. A failsafe in case Iraq collapses

This plan is much better than either plan submitted by the two presidential contenders: McCain would stay too long (forever), Obama too short (16 months). This plan does not have the drawbacks of either.

Michael Cohen over at Democracy Arsenal and in the WSJ today argues that no immunity for private contractors will impede on their ability to do their duty properly in Iraq. That is not true for at least two reasons:
1. Any private contractors put on trial that didn’t really do anything wrong will not be convicted; U.S. pressure will assure to that.
2. Because the Iraqi government was so strong about putting this resolution in the agreement, the government gains legitimacy among the Iraqi people. Maliki, in particular, looks extra-nationalist and therefore extra popular.

On Iran
I’ve noticed a lack of discussion about Iran on this. I’m waiting to see Iran’s reaction to this (and consequently the reaction of Muqtada al-Sadr). I'll keep y'all posted.

On the Sunni Awakening
The NYT is also reporting that the Shiite-led Iraqi government is refusing to incorporate the 100,000 strong Sunni Awakening – Sunnis paid by the U.S. to take up arms against Al-Qaeda and other insurgents. It is vital that the al-Maliki government incorporates the Sunnis into the government. It is impossible to state the importance of this enough. If they are not incorporated, I fear a resumption of the civil war and a strengthening of the insurgency.

BRIEF: Shiites Blamed for Bombing of Other Shiites - Iran?

Reuters: U.S. blames Shi'ite group ... for bombing and killing of 63 Shiites

Sure, it's easy to see they're trying to stir up sectarian violence. But if your sect is that important, why not blow up some Sunnis instead of your own Shiites? 3 possibilities:

1. It was accident.
2. Religion isn't as important in Iraq as it's made out to be. Or maybe the situation has evolved to that state.
3. The special Shiite cell was from Iran and didn't care so much for Iraqi Shiites.

Option 3 seems the most likely, for several reasons. See: Europe announces new Iranian sanctions during Bush visit

U.S, Iran, Neighbors Meet Over Iraq

Reuters: U.S., Iran and Arab neighbors to meet on Iraq

This will be the first time Iranian and American negotiators will (publicly) be in the same room since talks over Iraqi security have been suspended. The U.S. should take this chance to publicly say:
1. That a peaceful Iraq will not be possible without Iran
2. Iran should stop arming Shiite militias
3. A stable Iraq is in the interests of Iran and the Sunni countries of the region

Shit.

That sums up my feelings of this story.

Will the Arming of Sunni Militias in Iraq Pressure Iran?

Daniel Graeber has an interesting article in UPI (h/t) on the long term consequences of arming Sunni militias in Iraq.

But as the Sons of Iraq increasingly shed blood for the country, they are growing increasingly disenfranchised with the political rewards. Iraqis, including the Awakening Councils, want peace and stability, but as in any form of participatory government, they also want power. In Diyala province recently, members of the Sons of Iraq abandoned their checkpoints in protest of the Iraqi central government’s choice for police chief, who happened to be Shiite. That’s just one minor example of the swelling tide of political discontent emerging from the Awakening Councils, as many simply see no purpose in continuing the fight as the Awakening came with few rewards. Adding to the complexity is the tenuous cease-fire by the fighters loyal to the Shiite cleric Moqtada Sadr, who many of the Sawha forces fear.

I had Graeber's way of thinking until last week. Then I had a realization: what if the danger of arming the Sunnis was intentional? Why would anyone in their right mind do that, you may (rightfully) ask. Well, who is the United State's number one rival in the Middle East right now? Shiite Iran. Emphasis on the whole Shiite part.

Armed Sunni militias would make Iran's goal of puppeteering Iraq much, much harder for obvious reasons.

Not only that, but Iran really, really, really does not want to see the Sunnis rise up again in Iraq. The Iraq-Iran war in the 1980s resulted in the deaths of up to a million of the youngest and brightest Iranian men. Now, I'm not suggesting that Iraq would enter another conflict with Iraq, but this is still scary stuff for Iran.

Was this the Bush Administration’s intention? I have no way to know. All I know is that this is one of the consequences that we are going to have to deal with in the coming years.

Of course, there are still the many dangerous consequences Graeber mentions. For example, he and I both noticed the frightening similarities between our arming of Sunni militias now and our arming of the Afghani mujahedin during the Cold War.

Nominating a New CENTCOM Chief

Background
It has just been announced that the commander of CENTCOM, the command that overseas the Middle East, Admiral Fallon, has resigned. This comes a week after a story was published in Esquire that portrayed Fallon as the only person stopping the President from going to war with Iran. In a press conference today, Robert Gates denied that those perceptions are true, but of course, you can't believe that for certain.

Choosing a new chief
Congress needs to quickly approve or deny any nomination President Bush puts forward based on a couple of their key beliefs: their position on Iraq policy, Iran policy and how diplomatic they would be. Congress must nominate a moderate who can, on occasion, stand up to the Bush Administration and their sometimes radical policy.

Good News: Sadr to Extend Ceasefire?

Sources tell Reuters that "powerful Shi'ite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr is expected to extend a six-month ceasefire by his Mehdi Army militia."

This is great news. Moqtada al-Sadr's peacefire has been one of the reasons the surge has had such military success.

If he doesn't extend the ceasefire
If Sadr decides to end the ceasefire, contrary to Reuter's anonymous source's beliefs, the effect could be devastating.

Shiite on Shiite violence would flare up, as would Shiite on Sunni. New chaos would only slow the already snail-paced political action.

But why would Sadr want to reextend the truce?
A couple of reasons:
1. The U.S.
The United States has kept up pressure militarily and politically to hold Sadr down. The surge was one of the key reasons the Shiite cleric called for the ceasefire; once it began winding down, Sadr could have expected to be able to end his truce and not have to worry about too many Americans. There was a change: Defense secretary Robert Gates came out last month and said troop withdrawals could stop in the spring. This has probably given Sadr a lot to think about.
2. The Iraqi government
The Iraqi government has also kept up the pressure on al Sadr.
3. The Iraqi people
Let’s give the guy the benefit of the doubt: he’s looking for a peaceful solution without having too many casualties.
4. Iran
This, in my opinion, is the most interesting force possibly pushing al-Sadr to continue the cessation of hostilities. The U.S. and Iran have been having talks over Iraq for quite a while now, but no news has made it out of the talks. Have the two countries struck some sort of a deal? Even if they haven’t, is Iran looking to make a deal and holding al-Sadr back so one can be made?

It’s possible.

Romano Who?

BBC: Italian PM Romano Prodi Resigns

It’s too bad that nobody cares.

Italy has lost all of its geopolitical influence to corruption and organized crime. It withdrew its soldiers from Afghanistan in 2006; it’s not involved in Iraq.

Does the U.S. Have a Moral Obligation in Iraq?

Let's pretend the U.S. pulled out of Iraq in the coming months because the President had a huge change of heart. 90% of our troops are gone, by, let's say July 2009.

What happens then?

Let's say, for the sake of discussion, all out civil war breaks out in Iraq, but is limited to that country.

Hundreds and thousands of Iraqis are dying every day, every week, every month. Does the U.S. have a moral obligation to step in and try to resolve the fighting?

Or instead, do we sit back and watch, and wait for the rest of the region to potentially join in?

Cash Money

Days after I publish my analysis concluding the U.S. will use the NIE to work with Iran over Iraq... Well what do you know... More U.S., Iran talks next week

Iran and the NIE: Where We Go From Here

We’ve talked a lot about the recent National Intelligence Estimate, and rightly so. It is having a tremendous impact on U.S. foreign policy on the foreign policy of any great power. What we have not yet discussed is where we go from here.

In Iraq
As I’ve pointed out before, the NIE can be and most likely will be exploited as a tool to solve the crisis in Iraq. To summarize, the U.S. needs Iran on board to have a politically stable Iraq, and Iran needs the U.S. to allow Iran to influence events in Iraq in Iran’s favor. You might want to read that sentence twice. The biggest obstacle since negotiations have begun stopping the U.S. from getting what it wants has been Iran’s supposed nuclear weapons program. Iran has been using its nuclear program as a bargaining chip; if they surrender on the nuclear issue, they would expect to see concessions from the U.S. on the Iraq issue.

Now, the U.S. has a real chance to turn Iraq into a stable, democratic country that can be a model for the whole region. The U.S. could possibly even imagine achieving the goal of the Iraq invasion: a safe, friendly, democratic country in the Middle East. This possibility can only come into fruition if we continue negotiations with Iran over Iraq, and take advantage of the fact that now Iran has lost its biggest bargaining chip.

At the U.N.
Though the threat of Iran has appeared to diminish, the need for global political pressure is still necessary. Iran still has the capability, though no longer the intentions, to restart its weapons program and to build nuclear weapons. Therefore, the need for continuing pressure and sanctions is twofold: one, to ensure Iran does not restart its weapons program and two, to possibly coerce Iran into giving up its civilian nuclear program.

The need to guarantee Iran’s weapons program is never resurrected is self explanatory. We need to continue sanctions at the U.N. until Iran allows full open inspections of its facilities. Until then, there is always the possibility that Iran could restart its weapons program, and we cannot allow that to happen.

The reasoning behind compelling Iran to give up its civilian nuclear program is not as simple. The logic behind this requires an understanding of the broader Middle East and its countries. When it became public that Iran had worked on a nuclear weapons program at one time, the neighboring countries, especially those with majority Sunni populations, reacted with fear. The possibility of a regional arms race quickly became clear. This hit a high point in late 2006 when several regional countries, including Saudi Arabia, expressed ‘interest’ in nuclear power.

A world where the highly volatile region of the Middle East constantly has nuclear missiles pointing at each other would be unacceptable. As unacceptable as that would be to us westerners, Saudi Arabians would find a nuclear Iran even more unacceptable. Not only that, but it is unlikely Saudi Arabia, or any other Middle Eastern country, would find an Iran with civilian nuclear power any more bearable than an Iran with a nuclear weapon. A country often can claim it is developing civilian nuclear power, when in actuality, it is developing nuclear weapons, hidden from the eyes of U.N. and U.S. weapons inspectors.

And if there were to be a regional arms race?

If you thought a single country going nuclear was bad…

On My NIE Analysis
The Significance of the NIE
Why The NIE Should Be Trusted
How Will the NIE be Used?

On My NIE Analysis

I would just like to say, as a disclaimer, that I have no experience in government intelligence or at think tanks or anything like that. Although, I do feel I have read enough news reports and enough news analysis so that I think I have a good feel for what's going on in the world.

Shane has questioned the basic thesis of my analysis: that the NIE report will be used in negotiations over Iraq. Let me say this: This isn't why the intelligence was produced, but how it will be used.

Also, the thesis makes perfect sense. The government could have hushed up the report and never had it released. Or, they could have had it released, but criticized and attacked it and ripped it to shreds. But they haven't.

More on the NIE:

On My NIE Analysis
The Significance of the NIE
Why The NIE Should Be Trusted
How Will the NIE be Used?

How Will the NIE be Used?

About time I wrote about this. Iran nuclear weapons report finally released, and says Iran has suspended its nuclear weapons program, etc., here comes the analysis.

It is important to consider the use of this report by the Bush Administration. Far lefties *cough* DAILY KOS *cough* have been milking this for all it’s worth. It’s a big dent in the Administration’s policy towards Iran, and the far right isn’t going to get a war with Iran. It’s huge. But in fact, I’d say this helps Bush more than it hurts him. Are you skeptic? You should be. But I won’t need a National Intelligence Estimate to convince you.

Uses by the Administration
1. To discredit Hillary Clinton based on her vote to classify the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps as terrorists - HIGHLY UNLIKELY
2. To pass the problem of a nuclear Iran on to the next administration - UNLIKELY BUT POSSIBLE
3. As an excuse for NOT going to war with Iran - LIKELY
4. To take away Iran’s biggest bargaining chip - HIGHLY LIKELY

Iran’s biggest bargaining chip
As you can probably tell, numbers three and four are the most important. Number one I’d reserve for hardcore Clinton supporter conspiracy theorists.

We’ll start with use number four. To understand this, we have to take Iraq into the equation. Iraq is the President’s biggest concern right now. He may not show it in public, but it’s his biggest worry. It’s his legacy. He’s not going to be remembered for denuclearizing North Korea, or an attempt at Israeli-Palestinian peace. He’s going to be remembered for the invasions of both Afghanistan and the disastrous invasion of Iraq. And with little more than a year left in his presidency, it’s more on his mind than ever.

Consequently, he’s been working hard in order to improve the image of how successful the coalition of the willing has been in Iraq. He’s hired General Petraeus, a counterinsurgency expert, and has willfully engaged in talks with Middle Eastern states over the situation in Iraq. One of those states has been Iran.

Iran is crucial to the stabilization of Iraq. They have influence over much of the Shiite population, their leaders, and their weapons. It will be impossible to have even semi-stable state in Iraq without the support of Iran. The good news, Iran would love to see a friendly, stable Iraq under Shiite control. To get a friendly, stable, Shiite Iraq, Iran needs the U.S.

It may sound like a win-win situation, but like everything geopolitical, it’s not that simple in any way. It’s complicated by bad U.S.-Iran relations and uncooperative presidents on both sides. Iran wants a more Shiite dominated, Iranian influenced Iraq than the U.S. would care to give them. But Iran has had one huge bargaining chip the U.S. hasn’t been able to ignore: its nuclear weapons program.

Up until a few months ago, when the current NIE was being finalized, it appeared Iran had a weapons program (the last NIE thought the same). Iran didn’t mind; it gave them a huge bargaining chip. So, behind back doors, it played along.

But now Iran has lost this influence, because of this report. The U.S. could have the upper hand in Iraq negotiations, and Bush could receive a more favorable view from historians than even appeared possible six months ago.

Use number three, “an excuse for not going to war with Iran,” has just as much to do with Bush’s legacy as use number three. A third war on the president’s report card would be given an ‘F’ by historians, and could possibly an expulsion (read: impeachment) by the school administrators even before that.

Of course, this is a very oversimplified version of the situation. There are many more players involved: Russia, Saudi Arabia, etc.

Effects
Now that we’re done with all that, it’s probably a pretty good idea to see the consequences of the report. These, compared to the reasoning for the report, are simple.

1. Repercussions at U.S.-Iran discussions over Iraq (as discussed above)
2. Allies less likely to pursue sanctions at the U.N. (specifically Russia and China)
3. Virtually no chance of war with Iran
4. Cheney very disappointed (just kidding)

It will be interesting to see how this plays out in the months ahead.

On My NIE Analysis
The Significance of the NIE
Why The NIE Should Be Trusted
How Will the NIE be Used?