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Showing posts with label Kosovo. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Kosovo. Show all posts

A List of Former Soviet Breakaway Regions and How We Can Prevent the Next South Ossetia

BBC: Russian recognizes Georgian rebels
Reuters: Russia warns Moldova against Georgian mistake

A list of former Warsaw Pact breakaway regions
It is easy to forget, with the way the mainstream media acts, that Kosovo, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia are not the only regions trying to gain independence in the former Soviet Union (FSU) and its regional allies – the countries of the Warsaw Pact. Almost all of these regions have received backing from Russia. Without further ado, the list:

Movements supported by Russia
• South Ossetia (Georgia)
• Abkhazia (Georgia)
• Nagorno-Karabakh (Azerbaijan)
• Nakhchivan (Armenia)
• Crimea (Ukraine)
• Transnistria (Moldova)

Movements not supported by Russia
• Chechnya (Russia)
• Kosovo (formerly in Serbia)

The next war
Where is Russia most likely to provoke war in next? Crimea in the Ukraine has been widely seen as the next target. The Ukraine almost received NATO membership this year, and is becoming a closer ally of the United States. Russia has begun handing out citizenship to those living in Crimea – exactly what it did in Georgia, and Russia’s main excuse for war.

However, Crimea has not been a flashpoint for violence, unlike South Ossetia and Abkhazia. As well, Ukrainian president Viktor Yushchenko is not as nationalistic or as hotheaded as Georgian president Mikhail Saakashvili.

Preventive measures
As I’ve argued before, we must include Georgia and the Ukraine in NATO as soon as possible. One, to deter Russian aggression and to ensure any attack by Russia could be properly responded to. Two, to isolate Russia. The policy of containment worked during the Cold War. There’s no reason it shouldn’t work now.

Will Russia Recognize the Georgia Breakaway Regions of South Ossetia and Abkhazia? - NATO/U.S. Policy in Eastern Europe

Reuters: Russia MPs urge recognition of Georgia separatists

Background
Georgia, a former Soviet colony, has two de facto independent states within it: South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Neither region is recognized by any country internationally. Both regions have strong economic and political connections with Russia, and Russia has peacekeeping troops in both regions. In other words, Russia has a lot of leverage in these two areas.

Russian MPs voted unanimously yesterday to urge the Kremlin to recognize the two regions as independent if Georgia succeeds in its goal to join NATO. Russia has already decided to send more peacekeepers to both breakaway states.

Why is Russia being provocative?
There are four main reasons Russia flaunting its influence and being confrontational:
• Possible NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine
Kosovar independence
• American approval of new shipments of arms to Kosovo
• The European missile shield

The first impetus for Russia’s actions is the same impetus for the measure passed by Russia’s parliament. The NATO head of state summit in Bucharest, Romania, is going to take place on April 2. There, several former Soviet states will apply for NATO membership. Three of them – Macedonia, Albania, and Croatia – will be ignored by Russia. Two of applications – Georgia and Ukraine’s – Russia seriously opposes. And on Wednesday, President Bush endorsed one of the country’s applications: Georgia’s.

The second force driving Russia to possibly recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia is Kosovar independence from Serbia and the international recognition that followed. Russia was one of a handful of countries that did not recognize the new Balkan country. Russia supported Serbia in its goal of holding onto Kosovo; they failed miserably. Russia was trying to assert itself in its former sphere of influence. Consequently, when it failed, the Kremlin looked very weak. Russia didn’t respond immediately, other than cutting off some energy from Eastern Europe. I warned at that time that we could expect Russia to either (a) cut off energy from Europe, (b) cause the U.S. problems at the United Nations Security Council or (b) recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia. It looks like options (a) and (c) could be realized.

Thirdly, President Bush yesterday announced the authorization of supplying Kosovo weapons. This was just another action that is brazenly against the Kremlin’s wishes.

Finally, the U.S. and Russia had conducted high level negotiations last week over the planned missile shield to be built by America in Poland and the Czech Republic, and, well, they were a total disappointment. There was nothing the Russian government was prepared to do to convince Washington to change their mind; there were no concessions Washington was willing to make to please Russia. The negotiations ended in a stalemate.

How Washington should proceed
There are two arguments that can be made here. One, that Georgia is a vital American and European ally and needs to be protected and included in NATO. Alternatively, one could argue, tensions with Russia are strained enough already and either concessions need to be made so Georgia can be included in NATO or Georgia shouldn’t be allowed to join NATO at all.

What would be best for humanity as a whole? The second option: Concessions from both sides. Russia agrees to tolerate Georgia’s NATO membership bid, and the United States consents to make compromises over the Europe missile shield program. Either the program would be given up completely or toned down.

Really, in this scenario, it would be the United States that wins. America and her interests are not protected nearly as much as one might believe because of the planned shield (although, it is important to note, Russia is not hampered in the slightest by this missile shield as well). Therefore, it is not vital for Washington to continue the shield. In return, Moscow would allow Georgia and Ukraine to join NATO.

In fact, it is unlikely the next president (of the United States) would continue the shield anyway. Meaning, America would lose next to nothing, keep Russia happy, and gain Georgia’s acceptance into NATO.

Russia to Cut Off Energy to Europe?

One possible Russian response to Kosovo independence that I completely left out of my analysis yesterday was the possibility that Russia could cut off energy to Europe. This strategy has been employed before and is shown to be effective.

Putin might decide against this response because of the possible repercussions.

Kosovo Independence: Russia-Serbia Relations and Russian Reaction

Kosovo declared independence from Serbia on Sunday, ending months of waiting. The U.S. and most other NATO nations already have or will to recognize the nation as a sovereign state. This has all been expected for months, but there are multiple variables that could change, all depending on the reaction of one country: Russia.

Background – Putin’s interest in the region

The Russian government has let the world know that it does not approve of an independent Kosovo. But why does Russia even have an interest in the region? To understand we need to travel back to rough times in Russia.

Vladimir Putin took over the Russian Federation just before the turn of the twentieth century, after the economically devastating rule of President Gorbachev. Russia was weak, and the citizens of Russia didn’t like it. They had been the strongest nation on Earth, in power with the United States, for 50 years. And they wanted that prestige and influence back. Russia was sliding down a nasty slope.

So along comes Putin. The former KGB agent is ‘elected’, and takes hold of the Russian Bear, stops it, and swings it around in the opposite direction. Well, that is what he would have you think. It will suffice to say that during Putin’s reign, life for the average Russian improved. With the improvement of the everyday Russian’s life, so came improvements for Russia’s power abroad. The country is once again strong, and still getting stronger.

The Russian bear has once again gained enormous influence over its satellites. It has gained much of this power by promising to protect its satellites and their interests better than the West can. This strategy has been the central doctrine of Moscow’s regional policy since Putin took power.

Along comes Serbia. Although never part of the U.S.S.R., Serbia, deep in Eastern Europe, has always fallen under Russian influence. Essentially, Russia wants Serbia to look to Russia for help rather than the West. This is why Russia has been against Kosovoan independence. If the Russians can successfully stop the West from allowing Kosovo to secede from Serbia, Russia looks stronger than the West.

In other words, Vladimir is proving himself (and Russia) to Serbia. But Russia is not only demonstrating its recently regained influence to Serbia; Putin has staked a great deal of his political reputation on stopping Kosovo from gaining independence. He is proving Russia’s power to the rest of the world.

Russia’s reaction
100 hours have passed since Kosovo declared independence from Serbia. So far, we have seen a limited reaction from Russia; nothing more than more diplomatic protests than usual. Russia doesn’t have a wide range of choices. Military action is an unlikely possibility because of geographic problems and for geopolitical reasons. A trade embargo would seem to be likely, but would be totally ineffective. Of course, Moscow could declare a trade embargo anyways, in a largely symbolic move. But other than that, Putin has three moves.

Two breakaway regions in Georgia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia, could be recognized as independent or even absorbed by Russia. The two nation’s desire for independence has long been backed by Moscow, and Georgia has always been a thorn right on the border of Russia. Half of the country swallowed up by another would surely cause disruption. Russia would point to this action and say, hey, if you can change borders, so can you.

A second strategy might involve disrupting the West’s interests. In retaliation for the recognition of Kosovo, Russia could create problems at the United Nations Security Council. A potential target could be the third round of sanctions for Iran. This is the most likely Russian response.

This third approach is the most bizarre: do nothing. Putin has known the independence would come, and there’s not a lot he can do about it. If he were to stand back and watch the United States and the European Union control the situation, it would be very, very bad geopolitically for Moscow. They would look horrendously weak in front of the former Soviet Union, the West, and the rest of the world.

What should the U.S. do?
Now that Kosovo has been recognized, the United States no problems besides Russia. If Russia’s actions can be successfully contained, this whole Kosovo incident can be a good memory for everyone. Well, except for the Russians of course.

The United States has the most worry at the U.N.; that is where the most damage would be taken, and Russia’s most likely reaction. How can the U.S. prevent this damage from being taken? The Bush Administration will have to make concessions in other areas if they wish for the Iranian sanctions to pass.

A smarter strategy might have been adopted before Kosovo declared independence: pass sanctions before Kosovo declared independence.

It doesn’t matter now. It is time to look forward, and to develop a new strategy for dealing with the Russians in Eastern Europe.

Kosovo Sets Precedent for Other European Break Away Regions

Yesterday I wrote that “Kosovo declaring independence would be bad, because it would anger Russia, who the U.S. needs to help sanction Iran at the Security Council.”

One thing I didn’t mention at all throughout the article is another reason some are concerned about Kosovo declaring independence. Countries of the E.U. are worried that, should Kosovo break away, it will set a precedent for break away regions in their own countries. Specifically:
• Catalonia (Spain)
• Basque (Spain)
• Ossetia (Georgia)
• Abkhazia (Georgia)
• Nagorno-Karabakh (Azerbaijan)
• Transnistria (Moldova)

Not mentioned on this list, but making many more headlines than these regions, is Kurdistan. Though the countries which Kurdistan has ‘citizens’ in are not part of the European Union, the Kurds will be affected just as strongly by a declaration of independence.

What's the Big Deal?

Kosovo partial official results confirm Thaci win

This is very interesting. Hashim Thaci, besides being the newly elected prime minister of Kosovo, is the president of the political party PDK, Democratic Party of Kosovo. But what is even more interesting is that he headed an ethnic-Albanian guerilla group, the Kosovo Liberation Army, which fought for independence from Yugoslavia and Serbia in 1990’s. In other words, he is very much an Albanian nationalist. Kosovo has said it will declare formal independence in December if a deal cannot be reached.

So Kosovo might gain independence. What’s the big deal? The region of Kosovo exists in Serbia, which Russia supports extensively. Russia is very much pro-Serbian, and has made its position very clear to both the E.U. and U.S. The U.S. Russia has given special attention to because the U.S. has a large amount of influence over Albanians.

Once again, so the Russians care. What’s the big deal? Well, it’s kind of a big deal that the Russians control a permanent veto-wielding seat on the U.N. Security Council.

The United States needs the United Nations, specifically the Security Council, to impose sanctions on Iran, so Iran can be isolated (once again, coming back to that in a couple of weeks). The sanctions will only be effective if the United States can prove international unity on the issue, which right now it has not, primarily because of Russia and China.

Let’s recap. Kosovo declaring independence would be bad, because it would anger Russia, who the U.S. needs to help sanction Iran at the Security Council.

Expect to see Russia flexing its muscles for two reasons in the coming days and weeks. One, to send a message Mr. Thaci and the rest of Kosovo. Two, to publicly remind the U.S. Kosovo declaring independence would not help the American cause at the U.N.

Want more on Russian influence? Check out last week's post Russian Chess in the Middle East.